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Employee Self-Representation and the 
Law in the United States
Matthew w. Finkin *
Collective representation has been a legal focal point in the United States for nearly a 
century. Little attention has been paid to the law in the obverse situation: individual self-
representation. this essay explores how, on some issues, the law supports a regime of 
individual bargaining while, on others, is antithetical to it. in other words, US law is incoherent 
on the matter. By reference to law in australia and new Zealand, this paper argues that more 
legal space can be created for employees to represent themselves.
La représentation collective fait depuis près d’un siècle l’objet de beaucoup de commentaires 
juridiques aux États-Unis. On fait toutefois peu de cas de l’attitude des tribunaux dans la 
situation ou les travailleurs se représentent eux-mêmes. Cet article examine la manière 
dont la justice, dans certains cas, favorise un régime de négociation individuelle alors que, 
dans d’autres circonstances, elle y est opposée. Autrement dit, la justice américaine affiche 
une certaine incohérence en la matière. en comparaison du système judiciaire australien et 
néo-zélandais, cet article prétend que les travailleurs devraient jouir de meilleures conditions 
juridiques pour se représenter eux-mêmes.
* Albert J Harno & Edward W Cleary Chair in Law, the University of Illinois. An earlier 
version of this article was originally presented at the Voices At Work North American 
Workshop (16-17 March 2012), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Centre for Labour Management Relations 
at Ryerson University, and Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to express 
his appreciation to Breen Creighton and Gordon Anderson for very helpful comments on 
Australian and New Zealand law respectively, and to the participants in the workshop. The 
final draft has benefitted from additional comments by Steven Willborn and two anonymous 
readers for the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, to all of whom thanks are due.
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I. IntRodUctIon: thE dEmand FoR SELF-
REpRESEntatIon 
RIchaRd FREEman and JoEL RogERS’ survey of what American workers want 
revealed not only a yawning representation gap, but also the presence of rather 
nuanced desires in terms of the forms in which employee voice would be 
expressed.1 Significantly, Freeman and Rogers learned that although a majority 
felt more comfortable raising workplace issues through an employee association, 
a significant cohort preferred to deal with their employers individually or with 
the help of a co-worker. The sorts of issues with respect to which this preference 
was expressed are set out below in Table 1.
1. Richard B Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1999). The desire for representation and for forms of representation other than collective 
bargaining was further explored by Freeman. See Richard B Freeman, “Can the United 
States Clear the Market for Representation and Participation?” in Richard B Freeman, Peter 
F Boxall & Peter Haynes, eds, What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-American 
Workplace (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007) ch 1.
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taBLE 1: EmpLoyEE VoIcE pREFEREncE dEpEndIng on thE pRoBLEm 






prefer to solve 
problems with 
the help of fellow 
employees
66 53 44 39 34
By Self 33 36 54 59 65
Don’t Know 1 1 2 3 1
SOURCE: Richard B Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1999) at 55.
Freeman and Rogers declined to pursue this aspect of what their survey revealed, 
but others have become intrigued by the subject of individual voice. This subject 
was never abandoned by those of neo-liberal or libertarian persuasion,2 but it is 
now beginning to draw more mainstream legal academic interest,3 stimulated by 
the decline of American unionism and the concomitant claim of replacement by 
“an individual system of employee representation.”4
Yuval Feldman, Amir Falk, and Miri Katy have surveyed employees in Israel. 
They found that, along with other variables, younger and better-educated workers 
prefer individual to collective bargaining.5 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt and Timothy 
Haley surveyed the content of individual and collective agreements in the United 
States.6 They confirmed that “in the world of individual bargaining,” the terms 
2. For a survey of this literature, see Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, “Promoting Employee Voice in 
the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform” (2011) 94:3 Marq L Rev 765 at 
773-84.
3. See e.g. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Mordehai Mironi, “Reframing the Representation 
Debate: Going Beyond Union and Non-Union Options” (2010) 63:3 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 
367; Anne Marie Lofaso, “Talking is Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, 
Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System” 
(2010) 14 Employee Rts & Employment Pol’y J 55.
4. Leo Troy as cited by Hoyt N Wheeler, The Future of the American Labor Movement 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 4.
5. Yuval Feldman, Amir Falk & Miri Katz, “What Workers Really Want: Voice, Unions, and 
Personal Contracts” (2011) 15 Employee Rts & Employment Pol’y J 237.
6. Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A Haley, “Governance of the Workplace: The 
Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract” (2007) 28 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 131.
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of the contract focussed on the situation of the “marginal worker” (one who is 
young and likely to leave, in contrast to the collective agreements’ focus on the 
“median worker,” one who is older and less likely to leave), and  tended to favour 
the employers’ interests.7
Cynthia Estlund has made a compelling case for greater informational 
transparency in the labour market on the assumption that this will “improve 
the efficiency of employment contracts.”8 In turn, this assumes an individual 
bargaining process in which informational asymmetry is an obstruction to 
efficient bargaining. Estlund’s argument is directed to initial hire: The applicant, 
unlike an incumbent, is not likely to know much about the employer or the 
workplace, and so, informational asymmetry will be a salient aspect of the 
bargaining process, if there is one. As James Brudney has observed, the law in the 
United States does take some small steps to address this situation:
Courts reviewing disputes at the hiring stage are prepared to impose upon 
knowledgeable and powerful employers an affirmative duty to provide truthful or 
at least non-distortive information to vulnerable employees regarding their prospec-
tive employment. But once these unequally endowed employers and employees have 
formed a contract, the great majority of jurisdictions regard it as unjustified and 
unwise to insist on a similar affirmative duty of honest dealing.9 
In contrast to initial hire, the issue of self-representation in the workplace 
assumes an ongoing employment relationship; it is concerned with how the law 
deals with employees who wish to affect their terms or conditions of employment 
going forward, not through a collective, but as individuals.
On this, the law in the United States is a “dog’s breakfast”: the right to speak 
for oneself is accorded only parsimoniously and on a piecemeal basis, and where 
not accorded, an effort to speak is fair game for employer sanction. To be sure, 
most employees are not sanctioned for seeking to deal individually with their 
employers, nor could a non-totalitarian employment relations system function 
were that not the case. But, to the extent such courses of dealing are conducted 
under the shadow of the law, there is a disconnect between reality and the law, 
with the latter casting a pall over the former and over the idea of individual agency.
7. Their review could suggest that the terms they surveyed, governing benefits and post-
employment competition, were either adhesive or, if there really was a bargaining process, 
that employers had superior bargaining power.
8. Cynthia Estlund, “Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency” (2011) 63:2 Stan L 
Rev 351 at 357.
9. James J Brudney, “Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
in American Employment Law” (2011) 32 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 773 at 807-08 [citation 
omitted] [Brudney, “Reluctance”].
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The following discussion explores and explains this disconnect. Towards the 
close, sidelong glances will be taken at two members of the common law legal 
family that, by legislation, have sought to accommodate the desire for self-
representation more generally. These are merely instructive of the range of the 
possible; they broaden the legal horizon. But from what appears, the United 
States will continue to muddle through, professing a belief in individual liberty 
that the law largely belies.
II. IndIVIdUaL BaRgaInIng and thE Law
From the last quarter of the nineteenth century and into the second quarter of the 
twentieth, combat raged between two competing conceptions of the ordering of 
industrial society and of the status of the employee in it.10 The war was waged in the 
lofty heights of academic theory, in the less refined pages of polemical pamphlets 
and the popular press, and in the trenches of industrial conflict, sometimes with 
lethal effect. On one side stood Capital, supported by the theoretical scaffolding 
provided by laissez-faire economists. They argued that the American employee 
was an autonomous actor possessed of agency, free to sell his or her labour to an 
employer on mutually agreeable terms. Necessarily, individual bargaining was 
conducted in the context of the law of obligations, of contract and tort. The 
latter protected the parties against deceit or other socially unacceptable sharp 
practice; the former assured the parties’ performance. But that was as far as the 
law should go. Labour-protective law not only defeated the market, denying 
the public the benefits of market mediation, it stripped the individual of 
agency. Such laws were exercises in naked paternalism that negated the ability 
of the person to be an autonomous bargainer in the market acting upon his 
or her freely chosen preferences. In this light, unions were nothing more than 
10. Montgomery captured the times thusly: 
The contest so pervaded social life that the ideology of acquisitive individualism, which 
explained and justified a society regulated by market mechanisms and propelled by the 
accumulation of capital, was challenged by an ideology of mutualism, rooted in working-class 
bondings and struggles. Chief Justice Paxson had charged the Homestead strikers with ‘insurrection 
and rebellion against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,’ and painter Theodore Rhodie accused 
the Pullman Company of depriving him not only of income but also of his ‘right as an American 
citizen’ to espouse and live by union principles.
 See David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) at 171 [footnote omitted]. On how this contest played out after the 
century’s turn, see Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker 1920-
1933 (Cambridge, Mass: The Riverside Press, 1960).
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rent-seeking cartels that distorted the market, with negative consequences for 
consumers and the unrepresented.
On the other side stood Labour, supported by Progressive reformers and 
institutional economists. They argued that the lone employee’s actual capacity 
to exercise agency was chimerical for the simple and obvious reason that the 
individual had little or no bargaining power. Actual agency—meaningful 
voice—was achieved by collective, not individual bargaining. To them, the law 
should step in to aid the weaker party by allowing the individual to collectivize. 
At and beyond the century’s turn, laissez-faire largely prevailed: the Thirteenth 
Amendment had freed the employee of wage bondage; substantive due process 
constrained the states from interfering in freedom of contract; and the at-will 
rule conduced towards the free play of individual bargaining, as both employer 
and employee could at any time demand a change in wages or employment 
conditions on pain of terminating the relationship summarily. Even where 
the state was sustained in its capacity to enact labour-protective truck (wage 
payment) laws as an exception to the Constitution’s protection of freedom of 
contract, it was licensed to do so in the name of achieving better equality in 
individual bargaining, the result of which prevented labour hoarding and so 
further contributed to labour mobility, towards a freer labour market.11
By the late 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 marked a 
sea change in constitutional doctrine. Not only did it open the door for more 
labour-protective legislation, it enshrined the conception of the employee as a 
lone—perhaps even timid and inarticulate—actor whose capacity to exercise 
real agency is effected by group, not individual voice.13 Under this scheme, 
employers have to bargain with the employee’s collective representative in good 
faith. In this way, the exercise of voice in the workplace is made meaningful.14 
11. Harbison v Knoxville Iron Co, 103 Tenn 421, 53 SW 955 (1899) [Harbison], aff’d Knoxville 
Iron Company v Harbison, 183 US 13, 22 S Ct 1 (1901). The law places the employee and 
the employer “more nearly upon an equality. This alone commends the Act and entitles it to 
a place on the statute book…” (Harbison, ibid at 443). By requiring full payment of wages in 
US currency on a set pay period basis, these laws prevented withholding and forfeiture that, 
in effect, bound the employee to the job.
12. 29 USC §§ 151-169 (1935) [NRLA]. 
13. The US Supreme Court was to give vivid expression to this perception. See National Labor 
Relations Board v J Weingarten Inc, 420 US 251 at 262-63, 95 S Ct 959 (1975).
14. See Arditi Bagchi, “Who Should Talk? What Counts as Employee Voice and Who 
Stands to Gain” (2011) 94 Marq L Rev 869 at 871. Bagchi deploys a different taxonomy, 
distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” voice:
First, “hard” voice refers to the ability to exercise power and shape the direction of the firm and 
its treatment of employees in particular. Second, “soft” voice refers to the ability to engage in 
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But under this scheme, the individual loses all power to bargain directly with the 
employer because a collective representative is in place.15  
The question presented here concerns the status of the 93.4 per cent of 
American workers in the private sector today who are not collectively represented.16 
When the NLRA was enacted, the assumption was that individual employees had 
few rights that an employer was compelled to respect. Over the past half century 
much has changed, and to that extent, space has been created for the exercise of 
individual voice. Let us turn to that first.
a. FEdERaL Law
1. invOking a SpeCiFiC StatUtOry eMpLOyMent right
When an employee invokes a statutory right—to be free of sexual harassment, 
to take family or medical leave—the courts require a serious engagement on the 
employer’s part and can require a course of dealing with the employee, bolstered 
by a statutory prohibition on retaliation for having made the complaint or demand. 
In some instances, the required course of dealing is framed in terms of individual 
bargaining. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of religion, for example, an employer has a legal duty to 
accommodate an employee with a statutory disability or with a religious objection to 
a working condition.17 In a term crafted to define the obligation in the former, but 
which is equally applicable to the latter, the law expects the employer to engage in a 
dialogue with or provide feedback to the relevant decision-makers.
 The ability to exercise power to shape the direction of the firm isn’t voice; it is just what 
Bagchi says it is, managerial power. Voice is not the ability to engage in dialogue, it is the 
power to compel the other party to engage in dialogue. That is how the Labor Act conceives 
it: The duty to bargain requires the employer to meet and confer in good faith over the 
subject of the bargain in an effort to reach an agreement. “Soft” voice in this context would 
be the employee’s ability to protest; it does not require the employer to engage in dialogue, or 
even to listen.
15. See generally, Robert A Gorman & Matthew Finkin, Labor Law Analysis and Advocacy 
[forthcoming in 2013] ch 19. The Labor Act contains a provision giving represented 
employees a “right” to present grievances individually subject to certain conditions. See 29 
USC § 159(a) (2012). However, the US Supreme Court opined that the provision does not 
accord a “right” in the sense that it triggers an obligation on the employer’s part to entertain 
the grievance. See Emporium Capwell Co v Western Addition Community Organization, 420 
US 50 at 61, 95 S Ct 977 (1975).
16. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, USDL-13-0105, “Union Members — 2012” 
(23 January 2013) online: <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf> (reporting 
6.6% private sector union density in 2012).
17. See 42 USC § 12112 (1990); 42 USC § 2000e-2 (1964).
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“meaningful interactive process”18 with the employee in a joint effort to see whether 
an accommodation can be reached without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
business. The phrase captures the concept of interest-based bargaining—where 
each party is expected to understand the other’s needs and seek to achieve a 
specific result accommodating both—and subjects that process to judicial 
scrutiny of its bona fides.19
Echoes of statutory support for meaningful self-representation can be found in 
other measures. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 199020 regulates employee 
waiver of rights or claims asserted under age discrimination law. It imposes even more 
exacting standards when such a waiver is made in conjunction with an exit incentive 
or termination program, all to assure that such waivers are “knowing and voluntary.”21 
18. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012). This regulation outlines the steps for a “flexible, 
interactive process.” The federal courts routinely apply it. Cf US Airways Inc v Barnett, 535 
US 391 at 407, 122 S Ct 1516 (2002), Stevens J.
19. See e.g. US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 
F (3d) 1103, US App LEXIS 17918 (9th Cir 2010); Tobin v Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, 433 F (3d) 100 at 108-109, US App LEXIS 28902 (1st Cir 2005). I am indebted 
to Rebecca White for bringing the latter to my attention. She has pointed out that where no 
accommodation would have been achieved, no process of meaningful interaction is required. 
See McBride v BIC Consumer Products Manufacturing Company Inc, 583 F (3d) 92, US App 
LEXIS 21771 (2d Cir 2009). But as much is true under certain circumstances of collective 
bargaining. See United Food and Commercial Workers International Union AFL-CIO, Local No 
150-A v National Labor Relations Board, 1 F (3d) 24, 303 US App DC 65 (DC Cir 1993) 
(collective bargaining over plant relocation not required if it would have been futile).
20. 29 USC §§ 621-634 (2012).
21. 29 USC § 626(f )(1) (2012). The effectiveness of a waiver of age-based claims turns upon 
whether:
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written 
in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the average individual 
eligible to participate; 
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this Act; 
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is 
executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to 
anything of value to which the individual already is entitled; 
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the 
agreement; 
(F) (i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agree-
ment …
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such 
agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become 
effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired… .
But, under subsection (F)(ii):
if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination 
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It contemplates and is in aid of a “course of negotiation” between the employer and 
the individual employee.22
Other measures assume that bargaining will occur, and strive to assure 
fairness. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), for example, which requires a 
minimum wage and overtime pay, allows those statutory claims to be settled or 
compromised by the affected employees.23 However, it has been held that such a 
negotiated settlement requires either the supervision of the Department of Labor, 
or approval by a court after suit has been brought.24 In the latter scenario, the 
employees are represented by counsel and “the settlement is more likely to reflect 
a reasonable compromise of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights 
brought about by an employer’s overreaching.”25 
These discrete pockets of protection have a larger dimension. In a world in 
which more employment rights are accorded—where, for example, employers 
might be required to give notice that they are considering a change in federally 
regulated benefits (such as pension benefits26 or stock options in closely held 
corporations27)—and employers might wish to seek waivers or agreed-upon 
program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 
days within which to consider the agreement… .
And:
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination 
program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer (at the commencement 
of the period specified in subparagraph (F) informs the individual in writing in a manner 
calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to—
i.  any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors 
for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and 
ii. the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the 
ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not 
eligible or selected for the program. 
22. Oubre v Entergy Operations Inc, 522 US 422 at 426, 118 S Ct 838 (1998).
23. 29 USC § 216(c) (2012).
24. Lynn’s Food Stores Inc v US Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage 
and Hour Division, 679 F (2d) 1350, 65 ALR Fed 691 (11th Cir 1982) [Lynn’s Food Stores]; 
Bouzzi v F&J Pine Restaurant, LLC, 841 F Supp (2d) 635, US Dist LEXIS 3489 (EDNY 
2012) (reviewing authority). Cf Martin v Spring Break ’83 Productions, LLC, 688 F (3d) 247, 
US App LEXIS 15285 (5th Cir 2012) (union may settle FLSA claim where complaining 
employees were represented by counsel and accepted the sums paid, distinguishing Lynn’s 
Food Stores on its facts).
25. Lynn’s Food Stores, supra note 24 at 1345.
26. See e.g. Ballone v Eastman Kodak Co, 109 F (3d) 117, US App LEXIS 5430 (2d Cir 1997); 
Hockett v Sun Company Inc, 109 F (3d) 1515, US App LEXIS 5827 (10th Cir 1997). I am 
indebted to Steven Willborn for bringing these to my attention.
27. Jordan v Duff and Phelps Inc, 815 F (2d) 429, US App LEXIS 4036 (7th Cir 1987).
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modifications of those rights, a process of individual bargaining might well 
result. (Much the same might be true when it is the employee who seeks the 
change, but doing so may not be protected; in fact, the courts are divided on 
whether an individual’s inquiry about the status of his or her pension benefits is 
protected by federal law from employer sanction.28) The fairness of the ensuing 
process might be subject to scrutiny under common law standards and, to that 
extent, would afford scope, albeit limited, for self-representation. As we will see, 
this scenario is echoed in the common law of some states.
2. individUaL Bargaining at Large
The Labor Act establishes a legal regime for collective, not individual bargaining. 
Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Board held rather early on that it would 
not certify a representative for a bargaining unit that consisted of only a single 
person.29 The Labor Act does protect the single employee when he or she engages in 
concerted activity for mutual protection other than collective bargaining—when 
he or she acts on behalf of a group or as a preliminary to group action. But under 
the current state of the law, a single employee acting on his or her own behalf 
in seeking better pay, benefits, working conditions, or simple fairness, would 
be unprotected for want of concert or mutuality, and could be dismissed for 
having so sought. Were employee Oliver Twist to say to his employer today, 
“Please, sir, I want some more,” he could be dismissed.30 An at-will employee can 
be discharged for any reason—even an arbitrary or morally repugnant reason—so 
long as it is not an unlawful reason, and seeking to bargain individually with 
an employer for better terms is not legally protected activity under federal law.31 If, 
28. For a review of authority, see George v Junior Achievement of Central Indiana Inc, 694 F (3d) 
812, US App LEXIS 18571 (7th Cir 2012) [Junior Achievement]. In this case, the court held 
that the inquiry was statutorily insulated from employer sanction.
29. Luckenbach Steamship Company Inc v Gatemen, Watchmen and Miscellaneous Waterfront 
Workers Union, Local 38-124, 2 NLRB 181 (1936) [Luckenbach Steamship]. Whether 
collective agreements negotiated for single person bargaining units are enforceable under the 
Labor Act is a separate question. See the discussion in Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v 1864 
Tenants Association, 181 LRRM 2817, US Dist LEXIS 14766 (SDNY 2007), aff’d 533 F (3d) 
98, 184 LRRM 2596 (2d Cir 2008).
30. Matthew W Finkin, “Labor Law by Boz—A Theory of Meyers Industries Inc, Sears, Roebuck 
and Co, and Bird Engineering” (1985) 71 Iowa L Rev 155 at 157. The trope has become a bit 
shopworn.
31. See Litton Systems Inc v Provost, 173 NLRB No 153, 173 NLRB 1024 (1968) [Litton 
Systems]. In Litton Systems, an employee who was dismissed for asking for a raise of $2.80 
per week was held to be unprotected. (In today’s dollars, the requests would be for a raise 
of $18.71 per week. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, online: United 
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instead, employee Twist had used the first person plural: “Please, sir, we want 
some more,” he could not be dismissed.32 More on this later.
B. StatE Law
1. invOking a SpeCiFiC StatUtOry eMpLOyMent right
Insofar as state law might replicate or expand upon federally legislated workplace 
rights, the law would echo the ensuing individual bargaining scenario the claim 
or demand would entail, sometimes explicitly.33 So too, where an employer 
States Department of Labor <http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm>.) There 
are further cases where discharge for the individual request of a wage increase was held to 
be unprotected. See National Wax Company v Stephany, 251 NLRB No 147, 251 NLRB 
1064 (1980); Parker Laboratories Inc v Jensen, 267 NLRB No 162, 267 NLRB 1174 (1983); 
Allied Erecting and Dismantling Company Inc v Collins Jr, 270 NLRB No 48, 270 NLRB 
277 (1984). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that a public employer may discharge an 
employee for demanding a pay increase from a private sector employer, for whom he worked 
part-time, with the knowledge and consent of the public employer. See Clay County, Iowa v 
Public Employment Relations Board, 784 NW (2d) 1, 188 LRRM 2857 (2010).
32. Employee said “we,” referring to himself and one other. See Approved Electric Corp v Local 
25, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 356 NLRB No 45, 189 LRRM (BNA) 
1433 (2010). See also Wyndham Resort Development Corp v Foley, 356 NLRB No 104 at 2, 
190 LRRM (BNA) 1121 (2011) (“The concerted nature of an employee’s protest may… 
be revealed by evidence that the employee used terms like ‘us’ or ‘we’…”). Nevertheless, a 
small corner of federal law, devised to respond to the repression of collective protest, may 
actually provide some limited breathing space for individual bargaining, albeit in unusual 
circumstances. The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 USC ch 6) prohibits the federal courts 
from enjoining any person from giving publicity to the existence of or the facts in any 
labour dispute not involving fraud. See 29 USC § 104(e) (2012). However, a fraudulent 
representation could be subject to injunction. A labour dispute is defined as any controversy 
concerning terms or conditions of employment, even if it involves only a single person. 
Ibid, § 113(c). One of the preconditions for a lawful injunction—for example, where 
the claims are fraudulent—is that the complainant seeking it must first have made “every 
reasonable effort to settle such dispute … by negotiation.” Ibid, § 108. For example, consider 
an employer who claims it is being falsely accused by an employee of wrongful workplace 
action in a “labor dispute” by emails to the incumbent workforce. If that employer seeks to 
acquire an injunction to prevent circulation of the emails from a federal or state court, in a 
jurisdiction that has legislatively echoed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Act would require that 
the employer show it has made a reasonable effort to negotiate a resolution of the underlying 
dispute. Cf Pulte Homes Inc v Laborers’ International Union of North America, 648 F (3d) 295, 
191 LRRM 2161 (7th Cir 2011).
33. See e.g. Cal Gov’t Code § 12940(n) (2012). This makes it an unlawful employment practice:
For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to engage in a timely, good  
faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable 
accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee 
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wishes its employees to waive their right to invoke protective law judicially and, 
instead, to submit their legal claims to an employer-adopted arbitration system, 
some courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability to determine the 
effectiveness of the employee’s agreement.34 As the US Supreme Court made 
plain, the fact that the arbitration agreement is one of adhesion does not render 
the agreement unconscionable per se;35 but insofar as the states remain free 
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether, under specific circumstances, the 
employee had some meaningful choice,36 possibly including an opportunity to 
negotiate,37 the law would give breathing space for self-representation.
So too, state wage payment laws commonly deal with the question of deductions 
from wages. Often written consent is required, but at least two states, Illinois and 
Michigan, subject consent to a test of voluntariness.38 In this, state law bolsters a 
regime of free agency by assuring the agent’s freedom.
Less strongly, state unemployment compensation benefits law may speak to 
individual representation by requiring an employee who quits due to allegedly 
unacceptable working conditions to have made a reasonable attempt to have the 
situation rectified prior to quitting.39 This places the burden on the employee 
to seek to negotiate with his or her employer on pain of losing the benefit. 
The employer is not required to negotiate, but the employer’s failure to respond 
reasonably would expose it to liability for the benefit. In other words, although the 
law here does not mandate a meaningful interactive process, it certainly encourages it.
or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.
 See also, Russell v Cooley Dickinson Hospital Inc, 772 NE (2d) 1054 at 1065, 437 Mass 443 
(Sup Jud Ct 2002). Contra Kezer v Central Maine Medical Center, 40 A (3d) 955 at 963, 
2012 ME 54 (Sup Jud Ct) (Maine law makes an employer’s engagement in a “good faith 
interactive process” an affirmative defence to a disability claim; it does not directly require an 
employer to “engage in such a consultation”).
34. See e.g. Adler v Fred Lind Manor, 103 P (3d) 773 at 783, 153 Wn (2d) 331 (Wash Sup Ct 
2004) [Adler]; Seawright v American General Financial Services, Inc, 507 F (3d) 967, 2007 US 
App LEXIS 26328 (Tenn 6th Cir).
35. AT&T Mobility LLC v Vincent Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740, 179 L Ed (2d) 742 (2010).
36. Adler, supra note 34 at 783.
37. Stirlen v Supercuts, Inc, 60 Cal Rptr (2d) 138 at 154, 51 Cal App 4th 1519 (Ct App 1997). Cf 
Franco v Arakelian Enterprises Inc, 211 Cal App (4th) 314, 149 Cal Rptr (3d) 530 (Ct App 
2012).
38. Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/9 (agreement must be “given freely” 
at the time); Mich Comp L § 408.477(1) (1978) (consent must be obtained “without 
intimidation or fear of discharge for refusal to permit the deduction”).
39. See e.g. Bombard v Department of Labor (Fisher Auto Parts Inc), 2010 VT 100, 12 A (3d) 533.
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2. individUaL Bargaining at Large 
The law of employment falls primarily to the states, and a state might address 
employee voice in more generally protective terms. As Brudney notes, some 
courts do require good faith leading up to acceptance of employment in the sense 
that active deception, or, more importantly, a failure to disclose material facts, 
might be actionable.40 In this, the law corrects for informational asymmetry and so 
facilitates a bargaining process. But, as Brudney points out, in most jurisdictions 
this obligation does not apply once an at-will employment has been entered 
into. In most jurisdictions, an employer can lie or fail to inform the employee 
of material facts in order to induce—or lull—the employee into remaining in 
employment.41 The stated ground is that because the employment was held at 
will, there could be no damage done; the employee could have been terminated 
at any time for any reason. This blinks at the fact that the employee was not 
terminated for no reason; he or she was kept on in ignorance, allowing the 
employer to benefit from the employee’s performance, all while it sought greater 
benefit by considering and later taking job-destructive action. To the extent the 
courts are driven by the lack of any demonstrable damage in an employee remaining 
in an at-will job, they have ignored the employee’s opportunity cost.42
40. Brudney, “Reluctance,” supra note 9.
41. This doctrine was adopted in Mackenzie v Miller Brewing Company, 2001 WI 23, 623 
NW (2d) 739 (Sup Ct). See also Cocchiara v Lithia Motors Inc, 270 P (3d) 350, 247 Ore 
App 545 (2011) (attending, however, only the loss of the promised position and not the 
one foregone). Cf Sawyer v EI Dupont de Nemours & Co, 689 F (3d) 463, 193 LRRM 
3148 (5th Cir 2012) (certifying question to the Texas Supreme Court). Delaware is one 
of very few jurisdictions to extend the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to forbid 
active misrepresentation to an at-will employee to remain in a current position. As the 
exception to the at-will rule is to be “narrowly defined,” it is not clear that it would extend 
to a withholding of unrequested information. See Owens v Connections Community Support 
Programs Inc, 840 F Supp (2d) 791 at 798, US Dist LEXIS 1590 (D Del 2012).
42. Another explanation may be in the difficulties of deciding just when job destructive business 
plans need be disclosed i.e. plans that may ripen but may never reach full fruition. Disclosure 
may cause valued employees to look, and leave for a greener, or more secure, pasture. This 
practical problem is no different, however, for employees who work under contracts of stated 
term to which the at-will exemption to deception does not apply. This rationale, which 
appears nowhere in the case law, only highlights how the employer benefits by keeping 
the employee in ignorance. Interestingly, some courts have placed a duty on employees to 
inform their employers of their interest in, or plans for leaving the employment to engage 
in competitive activity. See Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Robert N Covington & Matthew 
W Finkin, Legal Protection for the Individual Employee, 4th ed (St Paul, Minn: West Group, 
2010) at 238-40. Apparently, the obligation of good faith runs in only one direction.
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These decisions are also vexing doctrinally. The law conceives of an at-will 
relationship as a continuous series of offers and acceptance, where both parties 
keep a weather eye, so to speak, on economic, technological, and demographic 
change, and are free to renegotiate the terms from moment to moment. If the 
law’s role is to correct for informational asymmetry in the bargaining process 
leading up to an at-will relationship, in aid of efficient bargaining, one is 
hard-pressed to see why that information-correcting, bargaining-enhancing 
role would not be equally applicable during the course of an at-will relationship. 
The refusal to apply an obligation of good faith during the course of an at-will 
employment relationship is inconsistent with a legal regime supportive of 
individual bargaining.
However, a number of states have held that employer policies setting out terms 
and conditions of employment can rise to the level of contractual commitment—
for example, in affording some form of job security.43 In a few such jurisdictions, 
an employer would not be free to unilaterally to alter or abrogate such a policy: 
The employer must offer and secure acceptance of the modification with requisite 
consideration.44 In these jurisdictions, the law would support a process of individual 
bargaining potentially bolstered by doctrines of unconscionability or economic 
duress.45 Here the law echoes what it requires for the knowing and voluntary waiver 
of a statutory right.
To shift gears, the states are also free to fashion employment relations 
policy for those enterprises not governed by federal law, most often because 
they fall short of the Labor Board’s jurisdictional limits. Though small in size, 
these enterprises are not small in number. In the past, New York and Pennsylvania 
applied their labour relations laws to allow for single person bargaining units where 
single employees work in enterprises engaged in a common industry, e.g. as 
building superintendents or motion picture operators.46 The New York court 
stressed the statutory concern: “to encourage collective bargaining throughout 
43. See e.g. Duldulao v Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 505 NE (2d) 314, 115 Ill (2d) 
482 (1987).
44. See e.g. Doyle v Holy Cross Hospital, 708 NE (2d) 1140, 186 Ill (2d) 104 (1999).
45. Howard A Specter & Matthew W Finkin, Individual Employment Law and Litigation 
(Charlottesville, Va: The Michie Company, 1989) at § 3.11.
46. See New York State Labor Relations Board v Metropolitan Life Insurance Company et al, 52 
NYS (2d) 590, 15 LRRM 650 (Sup Ct 1944) [Metropolitan Life Insurance], aff’d 269 AD 
934, 58 NYS (2d) 343 (App Div 1945), aff’d 295 NY 839, 66 NE (2d) 853 (1946). See also 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees et al v P A Magazzu, Commerce Clearing 
House’s Labor Relations Report (LRR), Report No. 148, ¶ 65, 022 (Penn Ct Com Pleas 
1943) [Magazzu].
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a trade,”47 but the Pennsylvania court proceeded on a broader basis: that “the 
rights of an individual citizen under the terms of the [state’s Labor Relations] 
Act should not be different as a single employee of an employer, than as one of 
three or more employees of the same employer.”48 Interestingly, Pennsylvania’s 
Labor Relations Act defines a “representative” for the purpose of bargaining 
as “any individual” as well as an organization.49 Theoretically, an individual 
could designate herself as her own bargaining representative for a single person 
bargaining unit, i.e. in those instances, no doubt rare, where the position the 
employee occupies is not submerged in a wider community of interest with 
other employees.
III. a REFLEctIon on actUaL agEncy: IndIVIdUaL 
BaRgaInIng In an at-wILL woRLd 
A century ago, advocates of laissez-faire pitted individual bargaining as 
an alternative to collective bargaining;50 one hears the echo of this today.51 
The necessary assumption is that the individual employee is clothed with 
power to deal at arms-length with the employer. As we have seen, a portion 
of American employment law today does clothe the employee with a right 
to interact meaningfully with the employer over some terms and conditions of 
employment—effectively, to represent oneself. But, for the most part, not only 
does the law not do that, it allows the employer to treat the employee not as a 
bargaining partner possessed of agency but as a being in a state of near tutelage, 
akin to a child, who can be punished for speaking out of turn for the temerity of 
asking for a better term or condition of employment. It would be expected that 
in the ordinary course such power would be used sparingly, if at all, to eliminate 
47. See Metropolitan Life Insurance, supra note 46 at 593.
48. See Magazzu, supra note 46.
49. Pa Stat Ann tit 43 § 211.3(e) (2009).
50. See e.g. US, National Industrial Conference Board, Individual and Collective Bargaining 
Under the NIRA: A Statistical Study of Present Practice (New York: National Industrial 
Conference Board, 1933). Note how Richard T Ely saw the future at the century’s turn:
The era of individual bargaining has passed away… . We must adjust ourselves to collective 
bargains between organized labor on the one hand, and organized capital on the other. Not 
suppression of organization, but regulation of organization, must be our watchword.
 See Richard T Ely, Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1903) at 390.
51. See Leo Troy’s quoted observation in Wheeler, supra note 4.
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the disgruntled,52 or, possibly, where collectivization is a prospect, as a signal to 
others. But the mere possession of that power in reserve, as well as its occasional 
exercise, negates any legal notion of actual agency.
The disconnect between the liberal conception of free labour and its legal 
actualization reflects an ambiguity in usage. The neo-classical model speaks in 
transactional terms of the labour market,53 which would seem to import the 
notion of individual bargaining. The word “market” incites an image of the 
Greek agora, the Middle Eastern souk, the medieval mercantile fair, or a street 
scene on the lower east side of Manhattan at the turn of the twentieth century 
lined with push carts before which sellers and buyers haggle face-to-face over 
price and quality. But the neo-classical labour market model is decidedly not one 
of face-to-face bargaining.54 In the neo-classical world, employers set wages 
and working conditions unilaterally against the backdrop of the impersonal 
forces of supply and demand. The “standard model,” though not hostile to a 
bargaining scenario, is indifferent to it. Nevertheless, studies of the economics of 
contractual transactions do attend to face-to-face bargaining; they are concerned 
with bargaining power.55
In legal terms, an employee who is hired for an indefinite period, and so 
serves at will, is a player in a near instantaneous series of contractual transactions: 
At every instant the principal (the employer) offers employment to the agent 
(the employee) on an “as is” or “take it or leave it” basis. The agent accepts these 
terms merely by continuing in employment. At any instant the employer is free 
to demand a change by making it, and the employee accepts by staying on.56 
So too is the employee free at any moment to demand a change and to quit if 
52. See e.g. Litton Systems, supra note 31.
53. See Henry N Butler & Keith W Chauvin, “Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A 
Framework for Analyzing Employment Law Issues” (1998) 8:1 Kan JL & Pub Pol’y 1 at 1 
(“Labor markets, like all markets that are based on voluntary transactions, are created by 
employees and employers agreeing to participate in a mutually-beneficial transaction”).
54. Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, “The Employment Contract” (1999) 8:3 Kan JL & Pub Pol’y 
71 at 78. “[W]e are not assuming face to face negotiations in this standard model.”
55. The literature is surveyed by Nick van der Beck, as well as Mireia Artigot i Golobardes 
and Fernando Gómez Pomar. See Nick van der Beck, “Long-term contracts in the law 
and economics literature” in Gerrit De Geest, ed, Contract Law and Economics, 2d ed 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 281; Mireia Artigot i Golobardes & Fernando 
Gómez Pomar, “Long-term contracts in the law and economics literature” in (ibid), 314.
56. Some courts are troubled by the harshness of this model and attempt, however awkwardly, 
to ameliorate the asperity by requiring some undefined breathing space before continuance 
becomes assent. See Kauffman v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 950 A (2d) 44 at 47-
48, 2008 DC App LEXIS 265.
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the employer does not agree. Economic theory confirms the common sense of 
the situation: The party who possesses superior information, who has a better 
alternative to accepting the term, who can hold out longer,57 or who is able to 
impose a higher cost of disagreement on the other, has the superior bargaining 
power. Under some circumstances the agent’s bargaining power can be zero.58
There are surely employees so strategically situated, possessed of such unique 
knowledge or skill, or whose replacement would be attended by such heavy 
transaction costs, that they have the upper hand in the relationship: high executives, 
leading sales representatives, key scientific staff, popular actors, and athletes. But, 
in the absence of these factors—where the employee can easily and cheaply be 
replaced by another in the job queue, where the employee would have to endure 
lost income and the cost of a possibly extended job search—the reverse would 
be the case. For most employments, the employer would be expected to be in a 
superior bargaining position.
Even so, it would seem to be one thing for an employer to flatly reject an 
employee’s request for a raise, telling the employee that he was already being 
“adequately compensated,”59 but quite another to be able to impose the severe 
punishment of discharge for having asked.60 In other words, the at-will rule 
bids fair to reduce the employee’s legal capacity to exercise agency to somewhere 
below zero.
57. This is dwelt on elegantly by EH Phelps Brown. See EH Phelps Brown, The Economics of 
Labor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) at 159-63. Not surprisingly, his subsequent 
discussion, “Analysis of Bargaining Power,” concerns collective, not individual bargaining. 
(Ibid) at 163-69.
58. Patrick Rey & Bernard Salanie, “Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of 
Commitment in Contracting” (1990) 58:3 Econometrica 597 at 606.
59. Litton Systems, supra note 31.
60. Various analogies to commercial transactions may present themselves where one party to 
a long series of market transactions with another chooses to stop doing business. If that 
decision were based on the price or quality of the product or service that was being supplied, 
the decision would be analogous to a rejection of the offer, not a punishment for having 
made it. If the decision was based on grounds without such commercial justification, it is 
possible that a duty of good faith and fair dealing—adopted, for example, in the Uniform 
Commercial Code for transactions between merchants—would come into play. See Melvin 
Eisenberg, “Relational Contracts” in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman, eds, Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at ch 11. However, the prevailing 
view in the United States is that there is no duty of good faith in the termination of 
an at-will employment relationship. See Matthew W Finkin et al, “Working Group on 
Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law” (2009) 13 Employee Rts & 
Employment Pol’y J 93 at 133-42.
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IV. BRoadEnIng thE LEgaL hoRIzon
Most developed economies in the democratic world have fair dismissal laws that 
would prohibit discharge for seeking information or attempting to bargain for 
something more. But some do more. The law outside the United States often 
provides mandates for meaningful individual interaction on specific subjects61 
as well as providing for collective information sharing and consultation. Two 
examples taken from the Antipodes do both, but the strand of interest here is 
their provision for individual self-representation. These suggest a range of the possible.
a. nEw zEaLand
New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act of 2000, as amended in 2004, enacts a 
robust scheme of individual representation.62 The employer and the individual 
61. To cite but one example, the German Part-Time and Limited Term Employment Act (TzBfG) 
allows an employee to request a reduction in working time. The employer must discuss the 
request with the employee “with the goal of coming to an agreement” and must consent 
unless operational reasons are prohibitive. The law is discussed by Maximilian Fuchs. See 
Maximilian Fuchs, “Germany: part-time work – a bone of contention” in Silvana Sciarra, 
Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, eds, Employment Policy and the Regulation of Part-Time Work 
in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 121. Claims of non-compliance with these obligations may be brought before 
the labour court. Other examples abound; indeed, the law abroad often contemplates the 
fact that individual bargains will be struck, and it sets the parameters within which such 
individual bargains will be allowed. To take only working time, under the English Working 
Time Regulations, SI 1998/1833, an agreement made with a group of employees, its 
representatives, or an individual employee may derogate from the forty-eight hour work week 
the law sets out, which entails a process of bargaining, in the latter, on an individual basis. 
See generally Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 
Italian and Spanish law similarly allows an individual agreement to regulate the amount of 
overtime the employee may be required to work. See Sciarra, Davies & Freedland, (ibid). 
Canadian law allows employers to modify work schedules in excess of legal limits by vote of 
70 per cent of the affected employees. See Federal Labour Standards Review, Control Over 
Working Time and Work-Life Balance : A Detailed Analysis of the Canada Labour Code, 
Part III by Judy Fudge (Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 28 
February 2006), online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_standards/fls/pdf/
research17.pdf>.The need in Canada to “create incentives for interaction between employers 
and employees” on work time was argued for by Harry Arthurs. See Federal Labour 
Standards Review, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century (Gatineau, 
QC: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2006) at 120 (Commissioner: 
Harry W Arthurs).
62. Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ), 2000/24.
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employee63 “must deal with each other in good faith.”64 Good faith
requires the parties to an employment relationship to be active and constructive in 
establishing and maintaining a productive employment relationship in which the 
parties are, among other things, responsive and communicative… .65
This obligation applies to:
(ba) bargaining for an individual employment agreement or for a variation of an 
individual employment agreement:
(bb) any matter arising under or in relation to an individual employment agreement 
while the agreement is in force:
…
(d) a proposal by an employer that might impact on the employer’s employees, 
including a proposal to contract out work otherwise done by the employees or 
to sell or transfer all or part of the employer’s business:
(e) making employees redundant … .66
The Act specifies aspects of the bargaining process67 and adds a specific 
illustration:
[A]n employer who is proposing to make a decision that will, or is likely to, have 
an adverse effect on the continuation of employment of 1 or more of his or her 
employees [is required] to provide to the employees affected—access to information, 
relevant to the continuation of the employees’ employment, about the decision; 
and an opportunity to comment on the information to their employer before the 
decision is made.68
The employer’s obligation to be “active and constructive,” “responsive” to 
and “communicative” with the individual employee in relation to any matter 
63. Ibid, s 4(4). 
64. Ibid, s 4A(c).
65. Ibid, s 4A(b).
66. Ibid, s 4(4).
67. Ibid, s 63A(2). This section provides that: 
The employer must do at least the following things: 
(a) Provide to the employee a copy of the intended agreement under discussion; and
(b) Advise the employee that he or she is entitled to seek independent advice about the 
intended agreement; and 
(c) Give the employee a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and 
(d) Consider any issues that the employee raises and respond to them. 
 It also sets out conditions that render an agreement “unfair” given the employee’s capacity 
to contract or an inducement to contract by “oppressive means, undue influence, or duress.” 
Ibid, s 68(2)(c). Additional sections also bear upon the freedom of individual representation, 
e.g. to select a lawyer as a representative. Ibid, s 236.
68. Ibid, s 4(1A)(c).
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on which an employment agreement may be made seems to come close to the 
American idea of engaging in a “meaningful interactive process,” save that it 
applies to all extant and future employment issues, not only to the claim of a 
specific statutory entitlement. The specific treatment of economic displacement 
affecting even a single employee, requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before the decision is made, will be discussed at the close.  
Suffice it to say, this law is very much a work in progress. How the scheme of 
statutorily mandated individual good faith dealing will work in practice remains 
to be seen,69 but it does present a model that accommodates the felt need for 
self-representation, that accords legal recognition of individual agency.
B. aUStRaLIa
In 2009, Australia enacted the Fair Work Act (FWA),70 an elaborate and, to an 
outsider, maddeningly complicated system that resonates against the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1988 and ensuing overhauls in 1996 and 2005.71 The FWA 
provides for the negotiation of an “enterprise” collective agreement (for a 
non-greenfield enterprise).72 An employer may choose to bargain with any 
employee organization if even a single employee of the enterprise is a member 
of it—so long as it has the capacity to represent the industrial interests of 
that member—or with any person appointed by an employee,73 which could 
be the employee him- or herself.74 (The employer becomes legally obligated to 
bargain if there is a majority support determination or a “scope order” in place.75) 
Therefore, it is possible that an employer must bargain, and bargain in good faith, 
with a diverse group of unions, representatives of individual employees, and the 
69. Gordon Anderson, “Good Faith in the Individual Employment Relationship in New 
Zealand” (2011) 32:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 685.
70. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [FWA].
71. Andrew Stewart and Anthony Forsyth provide a useful guide to the background. See Andrew 
Stewart & Anthony Forsyth, “The Journey from Work Choices to Fair Work” in Anthony 
Forsyth & Andrew Stewart, eds, Fair Work: The New Workplace Laws and the Work Choices 
Legacy (Sydney, Aust: The Federation Press, 2009) ch 1.
72. A greenfield agreement is an agreement setting out the employment conditions between 
an employer and a union for an enterprise that does not have employees. See “What’s an 
enterprise agreement,” online: Australian Government Fair Work Ombudsman <https://
www.fairwork.gov.au/employment/agreements/pages/default.aspx>.
73. FWA, supra note 70, s 176(1)(b)-(c). Employees must also be given notice of their 
representational rights. Ibid, s 174.
74. Ibid, s 176(4).
75. See Breen Creighton & Andrew Stewart, Labour Law, 5th ed (Sydney, Aust: The Federation 
Press, 2010) at 21.48-21.58.
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self-represented, all at the same bargaining table.76 The statute contemplates that 
an enterprise agreement will provide for future employee consultations and sets 
out a “model consultation” provision, a default term to be implied in the absence 
of agreement.77 The text is set out below. Even as it contemplates a system of 
plural representation, it would appear quite possible for it to have purchase on 
an individual self-representational basis.
Model consultation term78
(1) This term applies if:
(a) the employer has made a definite decision to introduce a major change to 
production, program, organization, structure, or technology in relation to 
its enterprise; and
(b) the change is likely to have a significant effect on employees of the enterprise.
(2) The employer must notify the relevant employees of the decision to introduce 
the major change.
(3) The relevant employees may appoint a representative for the purposes of the 
procedures in this term.
(4) If:
(a) A relevant employee appoints, or relevant employees appoint, a representative 
for the purposes of consultation; and
(b) The employee or employees advise the employer of the identity of the 
representative; the employer must recognize the representative.
(5) As soon as practicable after making its decision, the employer must:
(a) Discuss with the relevant employees:
(i)   the introduction of the change; and
(ii)  the effect the change is likely to have on the employees; and
(iii) measures the employer is taking to avert or mitigate the adverse effect of 
the change on the employees; and
(b) for the purposes of the discussion—provide, in writing, to the relevant 
employees;
76. However, the number of bargaining representatives can be rationalized if the bargaining 
process is not proceeding efficiently because of multiple representation. See ibid, ss 229(4)
(a)(ii), 230(3)(a)(ii), 231(2)(a)-(b). In order to take effect, an enterprise agreement must be 
approved by the agency that administers the Act, called Fair Work Australia. In turn, they 
must be satisfied that the agreement has been “genuinely agreed to by the employees covered 
by the agreement.” This is shown by a vote of approval by a majority of the employees 
to be covered by the enterprise agreement, subject to other procedural and substantive 
requirements. Ibid, ss 181, 188.
77. The model clause is based on one rooted in a 1984 decision of the Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission.
78. Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth), reg 2.09 [emphasis added].
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(i)  all relevant information about the change including the nature of the 
change proposed; and
(ii)  information about the expected effects of the change on the employees; 
and
(iii) any other matters likely to affect the employees.
(6) However, the employer is not required to disclose confidential or commercially 
sensitive information to the relevant employees.
(7) The employer must give prompt and genuine consideration to matters raised 
about the major change by the relevant employees.
…
(9) In this term, a major change is likely to have a significant effect on employees if it 
results in:
(a) the termination of the employment of employees; or 
(b) major change to the composition, operation or size of the employer’s workforce 
or to the skills required of employees; or
(c) the elimination or diminution of job opportunities (including opportunities 
for promotion or tenure); or
(d) the alteration of hours of work; or
(e) the need to retrain employees; or
(f ) the need to relocate employees to another workplace; or
(g) the restructuring of jobs.
This scheme is also a work in progress. That reservation in mind, it imposes a 
duty of good faith bargaining owed to the individual, albeit not as an individual, 
but as a self-representative. New Zealand law gives the individual employee legal 
agency at large, so to speak. Australian law is more closely cabined. But both 
require an employer to inform an employee of the prospect of a job-terminating 
decision and to entertain the employee’s proposals: in New Zealand, while the 
decision is under consideration, but before it is made; in Australia, when the 
decision is made, but before it is implemented. With these experiments in mind, 
let us return to the scene in the United States.
V. makIng SELF-REpRESEntatIon mEanIngFUL
American employees seem to want to represent themselves to have a direct voice in 
some workplace matters of deep concern. Over 50 per cent want to be heard about 
job training, for example, which is a critical issue in an era of plant closings, downsizing, 
and outsourcing.79 Can the law better accommodate this felt need?
79. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 1 at 48.
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a. FEdERaL Law
Not to put too fine a point on it, the political prospect of general legislative address 
reforming the system of employee representation at the federal level is nil.80 Thus, 
it falls to the National Labor Relations Board to fashion national labour policy 
within the confines of an increasingly anachronistic statute. Given the history, 
text, and long-standing construction of the Act to preclude bargaining units of one 
person, it would be extremely difficult for the Board to discover that possibility to 
have been latent in the Act all along, but even more difficult to create a general 
right of individual self-representation where the individual is not uniquely situated 
vis-à-vis her co-workers. However, that there is no prospect of a federal right of 
self-representation does not mean that employees should labour under the threat 
of discharge for having attempted it.
The statutory and historical basis for the right of the individual employee to 
present a demand or a work-related grievance without suffering retaliation was 
explored thirty years ago.81 The nonsensical distinctions the Board and the courts 
draw under the current state of the law tests our tolerance for legal perversity. It 
makes no sense to have the question of whether an employee may ask for a pay 
increase turn on whether a co-worker joins him or her in making the request. 
Nor does it make sense to hold the discharge of an employee for making such 
a request to be unprotected, whilst holding a co-worker’s protest about the 
unfairness of the discharge to be protected, as that employee would be making 
common cause with her co-worker for mutual protection. Would any nation 
in the civilized world allow an employee to be discharged for informing his 
employer that he thought his paycheck was inaccurate?82
80. On why this is, see James J Brudney, “Gathering Moss: The NLRA’s Resistance to Legislative 
Change” (2011) 26 ABA J Lab & Emp L 161.
81. Robert A Gorman & Matthew W Finkin, “The Individual and the Requirement of ‘Concert’ 
Under the National Labor Relations Act” (1981) 130:2 U Pa L Rev 286 at 331-46.
82. See Ryder Tank Lines Inc v Reese, 135 NLRB 936, 49 LRRM (BNA) 1597, enf ’d on other 
grounds NLRB v Ryder Tank Lines, Inc, 310 f (2d) 233, 51 LRRM 2512 (4th Cir 1962). The 
facts were these:
About a week before he was terminated Bough complained to Terminal Manager Morrison 
that he (Bough) had not received the amount of money that he believed he was entitled to 
for layover time on a trip which he had recently made. Bough and Morrison did not arrive 
at a mutually satisfactory disposition of this matter and on or about June 9, 1960, Bough 
(in accordance with a procedure recommended by Respondent) took the matter up with 
Respondent’s operation manager (Kruggel), who in turn consulted Morrison about the matter. 
Morrison testified that he resented this appeal to Kruggel even though it was in accord with 
suggestions made earlier by Kruggel and that when he (Morrison) was given the opportunity 
to select the third man to be laid off he selected Bough because of his going “over my head.”
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Nevertheless, even this measure, which meets the demand for individual 
voice only halfway, would face heavy sledding in the courts given the longevity of 
the statute’s more cribbed reading. And so it would fall to the states, historically 
the law’s experiment stations,83 to fill the gap.
B. StatE Law
Overwhelmingly, individual employment law is state law found in the common 
law of contract and tort and in hundreds of discrete pieces of legislation, from 
broad prohibitions to measures dealing with very specific evils. Under the law of 
federal pre-emption, the state may not regulate that which is arguably prohibited or 
protected by the Labor Act, but the state can enact a floor of workplace protections 
including, for example, a general prohibition on wrongful dismissal.
Consequently, whereas under current doctrine the state may not afford relief 
for employees who are dismissed for exercising collective voice per se, unconnected 
to the vindication of some other public policy84 (a bizarre state of affairs!), there is 
 Ibid at 943. The Board agreed with the Trial Examiner that Manard Bough’s discharge did 
not violate the Act as his action was “purely personal.” Ibid at 938. The case remains the 
law today. As noted earlier, the courts are divided on whether an employee who points out 
that the employer has not made its contributions to his pension can be discharged under 
federal pension protection law for having done so. Junior Achievement, supra note 28. 
Today, many states allow tort relief for the discharge of an at-will employee for a reason 
that violates public policy. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that 
public policy is not implicated in the discharge of an at-will employee for informing her 
local manager that she was not being paid according to the terms agreed to. See Barron v 
Labor Finders of South Carolina, 713 SE (2d) 634, 393 SC 609 (2011). Had the employee 
filed a claim for the wage due under the state’s wage payment law, rather than asking her 
manager for it, it is possible that a retaliatory discharge would be actionable. See Campbell 
v Husky Hogs, LLC, 255 P (3d) 1, 292 Kan 225 (Sup Ct 2011). This is only so where 
the statute is held to implicate the public good. The Kansas Court thought so, but the 
Colorado courts have not been so sure. See Crawford Rehabilitation Services Inc v Weissman, 
938 P (2d) 540, 1997 Colo LEXIS 491 (Sup Ct) (discharge for insisting on taking 
statutorily guaranteed rest breaks was not actionable). Thus far, demanding an employer’s 
adherence to state wage payment or minimum wage law is not considered protected 
activity in Illinois. See Trochuck v Patterson Companies Inc, 851 F Supp (2d) 1147, 2012 
US Dist LEXIS 37056 (SD Ill).
83. Matthew W Finkin, “Gli Stati Come Laboratori Di Diritto Del Lavoro. Stati Uniti E Unione 
Europea A Confronto.” (2011) 30:3 Rivista Italiana Di Diritto Del Lavoro 401.
84. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Association v Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
Company et al, 87 Cal Rptr (2d) 60, 73 Cal App (4th) 918 (1999). The state remedy 
for discharge for group activity over safety was not pre-empted because it was grounded 
in state public policy. Compare Luke v Collotype Labels USA Inc, 72 Cal Rptr (3d) 440, 
159 Cal App (4th) 1463 (2008). The state remedy for discharge of employee for assisting 
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no obstacle to a state extending its public policy to the discharge of an employee 
who exercises individual voice on his or her own behalf. Such a step would take 
individual self-representation out of the shadow of employer retribution, but it would 
not impose a general obligation to engage in a meaningful interactive process with the 
employee. Could a state take that next step?
No legal impediment presents itself. The federal Labor Act pre-empts the 
regulation of collective bargaining for the employments it covers, but affording a 
right of individual self-representation, akin to New Zealand law and the individual 
self-representational aspect of Australian law, would not enter that field. As the 
Board observed when it declined to certify single person bargaining units:
[T]he principle of collective bargaining presupposes that there is more than one 
eligible person who desires to bargain. The Act therefore does not empower the 
Board to certify where only one employee is involved. This conclusion does not 
mean that a single employee may not designate a representative to act for him; he 
has such a right without the Act, and the Act in no way limits the right. By the 
same token, this conclusion in no way limits the protection which the Act otherwise 
gives such an employee.85
As affording the individual the right to bargain for himself or herself does 
not intrude into the federal scheme, there is no legal reason why, in the absence of 
a collective representative, a state could not afford such a right even to employees 
of employers within the Labor Board’s jurisdiction.
The obstacle is not legal, but political, grounded in management’s foreseeable 
objection to the transaction costs the law would impose—to be required to deal 
and in good faith with all manner of demands and complaints made by each of 
its employees in a meaningful interactive process. The claim might have purchase 
in employments with large numbers of employees, for smaller employers tend to 
have personal interactions with their employees as a matter of course, and these 
businesses tend to be excluded from the reach of much labour-protective law 
in any event. But these larger employments, where the claim of undue burden 
would be most obvious to make, also maintain human resource departments 
that are established in part to administer employment policies and to deal with 
employee complaints. Consequently, it is not the prospect of meaningful interaction 
that would be objectionable, but rather, the imposition of a legal duty to do so, 
subject to potential judicial oversight. In other words, the very open-endedness of 
the obligation would surely be argued to be an impediment to managerial flexibility, 
co-workers in making complaints on working conditions was pre-empted. This anomaly 
surely calls for the recalibration of pre-emption doctrine, but that is for another day.
85. Luckenbach Steamship, supra note 29 at 193 [emphasis added].
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal962
despite the fact that the prospect of any significant amount of individual litigation on 
the quality of the interactive process would seem remote in the absence of statutory 
attorney fees or class certification.
In any event, a more sharply focussed approach commends itself: one that 
builds on specific interactive duties already extant in US law, presents little of the 
“floodgate of litigation” argument a general obligation would elicit, and draws 
sustenance from the more specific provisions in both Australia and New Zealand. 
These laws are adverted to not because they are unique—they are not86—but 
because they are from kindred common law English-speaking jurisdictions, “in 
the family,” so to speak.87 They give a sense of the range of the legally possible, 
within that zone of comfort.
Such a law would accord a right of meaningful interaction over those 
specific decisions that will have an adverse effect on the employee’s very 
employment—outsourcing, downsizing, or major changes in technology, 
production, or organization. These are not snap decisions; they are, or should 
be, the product of study and deliberation, to which it cannot be said that the voice 
86. Many European countries have well developed systems of works councils and methods 
of collective information sharing and consultation. See generally, Ulrich Mückenberger, 
“Workers’ Representation at the Plant and Enterprise Level” in Bob Hepple & Bruno 
Veneziani, eds, The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe: A comparative study of 15 
countries 1945-2004 (Oxford: Hart, 2009) ch 8. Such is now required of all member states, 
including the United Kingdom. See EC, Commission Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 
2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community, OJ 2002 L 80/29. Pursuant to the Directive on Collective Redundancies, 
involving plant closing and mass layoff, the consultative process must be carried on “with 
a view to reaching an agreement” which, as Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris point out, 
“takes it close to negotiation.” See EC, Commission Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ 1998 
L 225/16, s 2, art 3(1); Simon Deakin & Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 5th ed (Oxford: 
Hart, 2009) at 791. The duty to consult, with a view to reaching an agreement with a 
representative designated by the affected employees, means that employees who are not 
represented by a union must be given notice and an opportunity to elect representatives. 
Ibid at 802-06. This creates a framework for the ad hoc formation of collective voice, not of 
individual voice. So too, would an approach modeled on Australian or New Zealand law, 
insofar as affected employees pool their representational efforts.
87. The claim that the common law family is better conducing than those systems deriving from 
the civil law, for economically efficient results, has effectively been debunked. See Simon 
Deakin & Katharina Pistor, eds, Legal Origin Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2012); Nuno Garoupa & Andrew P Morriss, “The Fable of the Codes: The Efficiency of the 
Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Movements” (2012) U Ill L Rev 1443. These 
laws have been chosen because, to US legislators, they might be seen as somehow less foreign 
than European jurisdictions.
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of those who would be displaced would have nothing to add. These decisions can 
have devastating consequences for employees, their families, and their communities. 
The exploration of the bases for, alternatives to, and the consequences of such 
decisions with affected employees is no impediment to good management, but 
such interaction may result in a modification of the decision or the amelioration 
of its worst asperities. Job retraining, for example, is a matter on which employees 
want to be heard as individuals, as their aptitudes and desires are particular to the 
individual, and it takes on special salience in situations of reorganization and 
retrenchment. Federal and cognate state law have taken the first, albeit limited 
step of requiring notice of plant closing or mass layoff. If the affected employees 
are collectively represented, the employer is required to bargain about the 
effects of such decisions with the collective representative, in consequence of 
which the decision itself might be modified.88 Is there any good reason why 
employers should not give non-unionized employees a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard about such personally and communally devastating decisions while 
they are under consideration or before they are finally executed? And, if none 
appears, why should they not be required to do so?
VI. a RUmInatIon on thE FUtURE oF SELF-
REpRESEntatIon
As the Introduction pointed out, meaningful employee voice in the United States has 
been traditionally conceived of almost exclusively in terms of collective bargaining. 
Critics of individual bargaining thought of it as little more than an ideological fig 
leaf enhancing managerial power or blunting collectivization, and, in the United 
States, the law largely abets that skepticism.89 Nevertheless, here and there the 
law has edged towards clothing the individual with actual agency. The result 
is legal dissonance: The common law sometimes corrects for informational 
asymmetry when entering at-will employment, but, more often than not, not 
thereafter. Statutes supervene to establish a balance in bargaining power, but only 
on an ad hoc basis, the statutory ticket being good for that trip only. And absent 
88. First National Maintenance Corp v National Labor Relations Board, 452 US 666, 101 S Ct 
2573 (1981).
89. Whence the tension—or ambivalence—in Australia’s dual track system. See Creighton 
& Stewart, supra note 75. For more on the system of “individualized collectivism” see 
Breen Creighton, “A Retreat from Individualism? The Fair Work Act 2009 and the 
Re-collectivisation of Australian Labour Law” (2011) 40:2 Indus LJ 116. See also Shae 
McCrystal, “Fair Work in the International Spotlight: The CEPU Complaint to the ILO’s 
Committee on Freedom of Association” (2011) 24 Austl J Lab L 163.
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some special protection, an employee, being at-will, may be dismissed with 
impunity for seeking to bargain individually with his or her employer, or even 
to secure information from it.
In other words, the law’s conception of the employee is Janus-like: one face 
sees the employee as an adult who should be clothed with the legal capacity for 
meaningful interaction with her employer; the other sees the employee as a child 
who may be punished (or orphaned) for attempting to do so, not because her effort 
to represent herself is framed in opprobrious terms or is any way disruptive, but 
because it is made at all.
There is no prospect of change in the current state of conceptual dissonance. 
However, as private sector unions disappear, it is possible that legal scope will be 
legislated for individual self-representation on an unfolding agenda of discrete 
issues. If so, it remains to be seen whether employees so clothed will come to 
see the limits of effective self-representation;90 and, if so, whether the exercise 
of self-representation might stimulate demand for yet more91 and might drive, 
however modestly, towards a revitalization of collective action.
90. There are limits grounded in the inadequacy of individual bargaining to deal with collective 
goods. Note that only one-third of employees in the Freeman and Rogers survey believe in 
self-representation over benefits, job safety, and health, whereas a majority believe in self-
representation over issues of fairness and harassment. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 1.
91. John Witte’s study of one workplace more than a generation ago found that the desire for 
participation was expressed more by those who already had some involvement. See John F 
Witte, Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers’ Participation in an American 
Corporation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) at 27-28. A subsequent study 
of another workplace confirmed Witte’s finding. See Marc Lendler, Just the Working Life 
(Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990) at 75. On that, Lendler suggests that the provision for the 
exercise of voice has “carryover effects.” Ibid at 80.
